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Abstract 
In order to solve the problem one detection algorithm can only detect one kind of network covert channel, The 
detection approach hierarchical and density based cluster was purposed. Because the coding scheme of the covert 
channel would cause many similar data occurred repeatedly, the detection algorithm cluster based on density can be 
used to detect several kinds of the covert channels. Moreover, the detection approach cluster based on hierarchy and 
density is able to tackle of detection a noisy channel. Several detection tests were conducted, the detection results 
show that the algorithm can work well to distinguish the covert channel from normal network traffic even the noise 
level was about 20%. 
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1. Introduction 
The development of computer networks and intrusion detection systems are forcing hackers to seek 
more subtle way in stealing information. Network covert channel is a good way for these hackers. A 
network covert channel is a communication channel that allows two cooperating processes to transfer 
information on the network in a manner that violates the system's security policy [1]. Network covert 
channel works not only as a tool for hacking, but also an important approach to transmit secret 
information such as private keys. Accordingly, detection of the covert channel is a hot research field. 
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The initial covert channels were developed in the single systems, in which processes working with 
classified information level via the use of shared resources. As the increase of the network, more and 
more network covert channels have been used by attackers to communicate with compromised hosts [2]. 
Therefore, our focus here is on network covert channels to discourage the use of these channels. 
Initially, the detection of the network covert channel uses the signature based approach. People build 
and update a signatures database. When a signature is found in the traffic monitored, the sensor will alarm. 
By this method, many network covert channels could be distinguished from the normal traffic. For 
example, Schear et al. found covert channels in HTTP responses by verifying response header fields 
against the corresponding object metadata [3]. However, this approach can not deal with those network 
covert channels which were not founded before. In order to solve the problem, a new detection method 
based on the abnormal behaviours of the network protocol was purposed. Through monitoring the 
operators of certain protocols, people can acquaint with the normal operators of some protocols. When 
there are some abnormal operators, it indicates that some covert communications may be existed. But 
when being familiar with this detection method of the covert channel, hackers may design the covert 
channel with operators similar with the normal operators, which may cheat the detectors. 
According to these problems, a new detection idea was purposed that was if there are covert channels 
in network traffic, some regular characters of the traffic would appear due to the modulation of the covert 
channel, which causes the covert traffic to be different from the normal traffic. Through monitoring these 
characters, covert channel would be recognized. In general, the widely used approach to find these 
features of the traffic is the statistical method. Sohn et al. developed a support vector machine based 
approach to detect covert channels embedded in ICMP echo packets and the sequence number field in 
TCP header [4]. Borders et al. developed a tool for detecting covert channels over outbound http tunnel 
based on a similar method [5].  
In this exploration, in order to detect several kinds of covert channel with noise, we present our 
detection algorithm by cluster based on density and hierarchy. Section 2 introduces the detection method. 
Section 3 validates the effectiveness of our detection method by experiments with other detection 
algorithms. Finally, section 4, concludes the paper and discusses for our future work.  
2. Methods of Detecting Cover channels 
In this paper, our focus is on creating a mechanism that can detect covert channels in the network 
traffic. It has been suggested in the research of Cabuk that detecting a covert timing channel by disclosure 
the similarity among the inter packet delays. However, the same idea can be used in detecting a covert 
storage channel. The designer may code the normal value of the field in network packet to covey covert 
information, which would cause some same values of the one field in the network packet occurs 
repeatedly. As a result, we can monitor the similarity of the value of some fields in the network packet to 
decide if there are covert channels exist.  
2.1. Density and Hierarchical based Clustering 
Density-based clustering algorithms characterize the data distribution by the density of each data object. 
Clustering is the process of identifying dense areas in the object space. Conventional density-based 
approaches classify a data object as one of the cores of a cluster if has more than n neighbours within 
neighbourhood [6]. Clusters are formed by connecting neighbouring core objects and those non-core 
objects either serve as the boundaries of clusters or become outliers. Since the noises of the data set are 
typically randomly distributed, the density within a cluster should be significantly higher than that of the 
noises. Therefore, density-based approaches have the advantage of extracting clusters from a highly noisy 
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environment. In the following, we list the definitions of terminologies regarding to density-based 
clustering convenience of presentation. 
Definition 1: (ε -neighbourhood of a point) Theε -neighbourhood of a point p, denoted by ( )N pε , is 
defined by: 
( ) { | ( , ) }N p q D dist p qε ε= ∈ ≤                                                     (1) 
Definition 2: (core point condition) A point p is directly density-reachable from a point q if ( )p N qε∈  
and ( )N q MinPtsε ≥ . MinPts is a minimum number of points in a ε -neighbourhood of the point. 
Definition 3: (density-reachable) A point p is density reachable from a point q. If there is a chain of 
points p1,p2,…,pn, p1=q, p2=p such that is pi+1 directly density-reachable from. 
However, the performance of density-based clustering is quite sensitive to the parameters of object 
density, namely, for a complex data set, the appropriate parameters are hard to specify. A density-based 
clustering algorithm tends to result in a large number of trivial clusters due to the noise.  
For solving the problem of trivial clusters, in this work we present an algorithm based on hybrid 
strategy between the hierarchy and density based approaches. Considering of some cluster points formed 
by the noise with a low density, we use a hierarchical clustering algorithm generates a hierarchy of nested 
clusters according their density. Now, we list the definitions of hierarchical clustering based on density.  






=                                                                     (2) 
|C| is the number of the points in the cluster C , the density V(C ) is the value of |C| divided by B(C), 
which would be computed by how many unit ball the cluster C covering. 
Definition 5: The distance of the cluster Ci, Cj: 
 0
( , )





V C V C
=                                                                 (3) 
The distance of the clusters use Euclid distance, and d0= 2 2 21 1 2 2| | | | ... | |i j i j im jmx x x x x x− + − + + − . xij 
is the value of the projection of the core object of the ith cluster on the jth dimension. 
Definition 6: difference agrees of the cluster Ci and Cj: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ),    ,   i j i jCR V C V C V C V C=                                                 (4) 
It would be used as a criterion to measure the difference of the distribution of two clusters.  
By measuring the density for each data object, density and hierarchical based cluster captures the 
natural distribution of the data. Intuitively, a group of covert traffic will form a dense area, and these 
samples with the highest density within the group become the medoid of the cluster. Therefore, where a 
cluster is formed by noise objects, it has low density. So we can merger some trivial clusters according 
their densities. 
2.2. Detection Algorithm 
Detection algorithm of Covert channel is composed of two subroutines, they are clustering algorithm 
and detecting algorithm. When detecting, the detection algorithm will call the clustering component. 
Before introducing the detection algorithm, we should investigate the data obtained from the network 
sensor, which mode can be described as: 
S T X W= × +                                                                (5) 
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X is the input process of the network sensor, which can capture packets from the network. T is the 
modulation scheme of the covert channel. W(W∈Rm) is the noise injected during the transmitting process, 
S 1( ... )nS S  (S∈Rm) is the observing vector and m is the dimension of feature set, n is the number of the 
samples. Then, the similarly of samples S can be measured by the Euclid distance： 
2
1
( , ) ( ) ,1 ,
m
i j ik jk
k
Dist S S S S i j n
=
= − ≤ ≤∑                                              (6) 
The clustering algorithm works according the data in the set S, and then gets the number of the clusters 
and the core objects of each cluster. Let R to be the set of core objects, which initial stat of is null. If Rj 
( , jj Z R R
+∈ ∈ ) is a medoid of a sample Si( , ii Z S S+∈ ∈ ), it could be written as F[Si]=Rj. Let kj to be the 
number of the samples belongs to the cluster with core object Rj, which initial value would be 0. The 
clustering algorithm is described as: 
Stage one: finding core objects 
Step1 select one sample Si randomly as the core from the data source S，if there was a core object Rj in the R, satisfied
Si∈N(Rj)，then go to step2. Or, Si would be taken as the new core object, R=R+{Si}，Rjk=Sik，k=1…N，goto step3； 
Step2 let F[Si]=Rj，count the sample of the core objects kj=kj+1； 
Step3 if all the samples of the data source are correspond to a core object，go to step4，or go to step1； 
Step4 Modify the core object set / , 1... , { | [ ] }jk ik j i i j
A
R S k k K A S F S R= = = =∑ . Updating scanning times, c=c+1. the initial 
value of c is 1; If the number of the scanning is little than c, go to step1，start to scan the data set again.  
Step5 When ki≥p , Rj is a available core object of one cluster, or it is invaluable. Then, all the samples in the clusters responses to 
an invaluable core object will be allocated to an available core object, namely: 
[ ]  ( )  ( , )i j e j i jF S R Si N R dist S R ε= ⇒ ∈ ⇒ ≤                                                  (7) 
Stage two：Merging clusters 
Step6 According to the character of the data to compute the density Vi of cluster Ri and the density Vi of cluster Ri. 
Step7 computer the difference of these clusters cov(V(Rj),V(Ri)), and select the minimum of the them, descript as Cmin. if 
minC σ< ，then go to step 8，else go to step 6. 
Step8 Computer distance between of Ci and Cj, merging Ci, Cj into a new cluster Ck(k=1,2,3…) 
Step9 until all the data was processed, or go to step6. 
In the algorithm: ε is the distance of the cluster，p is the least of the number of the points in the 
neighbour, c is the scanning times, σ  is the density of a cluster.  
The clustering method could be robust to noise, outliers, and the parameters. It is well recognized that 
the covert traffic data are usually noisy and the rules behind the data are unknown. The algorithm of 
cluster is a sub component of the detection algorithm. The recognizing algorithm is described as: 





( , ) ( )
( , )
( ) ( )
S i j S j
S i j
S j S j
−= −                                                                                (8) 
S*(i,j) is the observing value of the jth feature of the ith sample, and S(i，j) is value after normalizing. Smax(j), Smin(j) is 
the maximum value and the minimum value of the jth feature.  
Step2 let A to be the unit matrix with the columns m, projecting S(i,j) to the d-dimension( the initial value of d is 1):  
  
1




z a S i j i n
=
= × =∑                                                                            (9) 
zi is the value after projecting S(i,j) to the ith d-dimension. 
Step3 call Algorithm 1 to clustering on every dimension, namely, (k1,…,km/d) = Clustering( Z1,…,Zm/d). 
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Step4 if ki=0 (1 i m≤ ≤ ), there are no any clusters in these features. It may no covert channel in the traffic. Feature Si would 
be deleted from feature set. if ki>1 some covert channel may exist, exit. if ki=1, d=d+1, go to step2. 
Step5 When i= m or P is empty, exit. 
If there are several clusters in the lower dimensions, it can be concluded that there may be covert 
channels existed. When there is only one cluster in the lower dimensions, and there are clusters in the 
higher dimension, the conclusion is also drawn that the covert channel may be appeared, or there is no any 
covert channel.  
3. Results and Analysis 
Our experiments are set up to investigate how our detection tests perform against five typical covert 
channels: (1) ICMP Shell (2) Covert length channel [7] (3) Covert TCP [8] (4) IPCTC [6] and (5) multiplex 
covert channel which was mixed by four covert channels before. We collected network packets from these 
network channels by three steps: First, different computers send covert information with different kinds of 
covert channels. Second, one sender communicate with one receiver with these five kinds of covert 
channels. The sender can switch the kind of the covert channel. Before switching, the sender must inform 
the receiver, so that the receiver can synchronize with it. Third, packets from data set NZIX-II were 
injected into the covert traffic as the noise [9]. All packets obtained by these three steps served together as 
the data set. 
For detecting the covert channel accurately, the parameters of the detection algorithm should be tuned. 
At first, it is the detection window, which means how many packets to be deal with in one times of 
detection process. As suggestion by literature [6], we run the detection one time for 2000 packets. 
Secondly, we tune the MinPts and Eps, and we found that when MinPts was set to be 300 and the Eps was 
set to be 1.2×10-3, the detection algorithm works very well. 
Because the accuracy of the detection test was also much influenced by the noise injected, we now 
consider the detection test under the scenarios of noise. We define the noise level is the ratio of the 
number of normal packets in the traffic and total packets. Then, different levels of the noise were injected 
into the covert traffic. The perfomance of the detection test is shown as figure 2. For the purpose of 
examining efficiency the detection test, we select 500, 2000, 5000, 8000, 11000, 16000 as the window 
sizes. The efficiency of the detector is shown as figure 3. 
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Fig 2 curves of detection performance with different level of noise     Fig 3 the speed of the detection of the covert channel 
In Figure 2, we can see that our detection algorithm works effectively on the covert channels in the 
case of noise being relatively small. As injecting more noise, the positive ratio varies slightly. But when 
the level of noise is up to 60%, it drops dramatically, which is because that the samples can not longer be 
classified into one cluster.  
We can know from figure 3, when the size of the window is 2000, the time of testing these records is 
less than 1 second. Even if the window size is 5000, the time required for testing all the records is only 
about 10 seconds. But when the detection window is increasing, the detection time increase fast. It is 
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because that the time of testing the high dimensional data increases in a nonlinear mode as the recorder 
increases. Therefore, it is favourable for the efficiency and the real-time of the detector when choosing a 
smaller window size. 
Our last experiment is to compare three detection algorithms of the covert channel, which are the 
approach based on entropy [10], ε-Similarity approach [6]  and cluster based on density and hierarchy. The 
packets produced by five channels, IPCTC, ACK command, Covert TCP, ICMP Shell, multiplex covert 
channel, are used as the abnormal traffic. These five channels worked with noise level of 20%.  
These three detection algorithm is of a higher detection rate toward the simple covert channel, the 
recognition rates were both more than 90%. But the entropy based method and the ε-Similarity based 
method are almost out of work to detect a complex covert channel. The density and hierarchy based 
clustering method is able to woks well on such type of covert channel, which detection rate is 94.11% and 
false alarm rate is 9%. Hence, the methods based on density clustering not only can accurately detect the 
traditional simple covert channel, but also can distinguish the complexity of covert channels from normal 
traffic.  
4. conclusions and future work 
We introduced an approach based on density and hierarchy to detect covert channels, which make use 
the character of the covert channel that values of some fields would be similar, but these values would be 
random in legal traffics. We designed the detection algorithm based on the cluster. According to the 
algorithm, the detection tool was explored and detection experiments were conducted. Our experimental 
results show that the approach is capable of detecting different kind of covert channels. 
 This work was an initial exploration of the detection of the complicated covert channel. Future work 
will include the investigation of other kinds of covert channel, and add them into the set of detection 
object to expand of the training set and test set. And we plan to investigate to other detection methods to 
couture with the covert channel. 
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